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MAINE PHYSICIAN PRACTICE
GUIDELINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
Jennifer Begel*
I. INTRODUCTION
The current debate over health care reform has seized the atten-
tion of the American public and has spawned proposals affecting
virtually every aspect of health care delivery. Perceived as at least a
minor cause of the growth in health care expenditures over the last
decade,' medical malpractice litigation has been targeted as one
area in need of reform. President Clinton's health care package rec-
ommends significant changes to medical malpractice litigation pro-
cedures and expressly promotes adopting such approaches as the
"program in Maine that frees doctors from malpractice liability if
they can demonstrate that they followed prescribed clinical practice
guidelines."' The President's report of his plan to the American
people explains that under a system, like Maine's, using physician
practice guidelines, a physician cannot be held liable for malpractice
if the physician demonstrates compliance with the appropriate
guidelines.3
This Article assesses the use of physician practice guidelines as a
vehicle for medical malpractice tort reform and focuses upon the
State of Maine's legislation incorporating physician practice param-
eters into the defense of medical malpractice litigation. The Maine
Medical Liability Demonstration Project4 (the "Demonstration Pro-
ject") legislatively adopts practice guidelines in four different medi-
cal specialties and allows physicians in those specialties to assert
* Partner, Friedman & Babcock; B.A., Bates College, 1982; J.D., University of
Maine School of Law, 1986; M.P.H., Harvard University School of Public Health,
1994.
1. Health expenditures rose at a rate of 12% annually between 1966-1977, from
$42 billion to $82 billion. Cathy Firshein and Janet Tokarski, Curbing Health Costs:
Many Tried, None Succeeded, A NEW DEAL FOR AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: How
REFORM WILL RBsHAPE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND PAYMENT FOR A NEw CEN.
TURY 167 (Richard M. Sorian et al. eds., 1993). By 1988, spending reached $547
billion. The 1993 spending figure was $942 billion. The U.S. Commerce Depart-
ment estimates that expenditures will climb to $1.06 trillion in 1994. THE 1994 U.S.
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK.
2. WHITE HOUSE DomlEsric POLICY COUNCIL, THE PREsirENT's HEALTH SE-
CU~rrY PLAN 91 (Times Books ed. 1993).
3. Id.
4. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-79 (West Supp. 1993-1994).
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compliance with the applicable guideline as an affirmative defense.5
The affirmative defense of compliance with such guidelines has been
touted as a means of protecting physicians from, and decreasing the
costs associated with, medical malpractice litigation.6 While the
statutory mechanism remains untested, analysis of the legislation
reveals the practical implications and limitations of the enactment.
Only in a very narrow window of cases will the statute, particu-
larly the affirmative defense of compliance, be advantageous to phy-
sician-defendants in reducing (but not completely eliminating) the
length and complexity of a medical malpractice suit. Notwithstand-
ing the laudable goals underlying the legislative guidelines, success
will be thwarted by two significant obstacles. First, the entire legis-
lative scheme for guidelines was designed without consideration of
the implications presented by the requirements of Maine's
mandatory prelitigation screening panel for medical malpractice
cases. Imposition of these screening criteria on the practice guide-
lines' statutory framework almost entirely undermines any hope of
avoiding the lengthy procedures associated with the defense of a
medical malpractice suit. Second, the legislation suffers from two
potential constitutional infirmities: denying plaintiffs the right to a
jury trial and denying plaintiffs the use of evidence regarding guide-
lines. This Article reviews both the practical procedural effects and
the constitutional issues triggered by the legislation.
This Article begins with a brief survey of the efforts taken by ju-
risdictions across the country to combat rising medical malpractice
costs, the emergence of reforms such as prelitigation screening
panels, and ultimately, the use of physician practice guidelines. An
explanation of the manner in which the physician practice guidelines
came to be incorporated into legislation, as well as their interrela-
tionship with Maine's prelitigation screening panel enactment, is in-
cluded in the second section. This section of the Article explains the
mechanics of Maine's prelitigation screening panel process, setting
the backdrop for illustrating the practical implications of the guide-
lines legislation.
In the third section of this Article a hypothetical scenario in which
an anesthesiologist is sued for allegedly failing to appropriately
monitor a patient is used to highlight the procedural requirements
and evidentiary issues triggered by the assertion of the affirmative
defense of compliance. The same hypothetical is used to explain
why this affirmative defense can reasonably be expected to curtail
litigation in only a narrow window of cases. The third section also
5. Legis. Ree. H756-57 (1990) (statement of Rep. Rydell). See also GENEAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, M. icAL MALPRAcnCE: MAINE's USE OF PRACMCE GUME-
uN s TO REDucE CosS 4 (1993) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
6. Id
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addresses the anticipated factual assertions that will likely under-
mine any summary judgment attempts.
In the fourth section of this Article, certain inherent shortcomings
in the practice guidelines' statutory scheme are reviewed. An analy-
sis of these shortcomings, like the factual assertions that will under-
mine summary judgment efforts, illustrates why the guidelines fall
short of achieving their desired results. Specifically, this Article as-
serts that procedural difficulties will arise because: (1) the prelitiga-
tion panel proceedings may generate a loophole through which
inculpatory evidence regarding inappropriate adherence to practice
guidelines may be presented to a jury; (2) a finding of compliance
with an applicable practice guideline is not necessarily conclusive on
the issue of negligence, especially in the context of the prelitigation
panel proceedings; and (3) the affirmative defense of compliance
may not obviate the need for expert testimony on the standard of
care issue at either the panel or trial level.
The final section of this Article discusses certain constitutional in-
firmities that may invalidate the Maine Demonstration Project.
First, the legislation contains a provision that makes evidence re-
garding compliance with an applicable guideline available to de-
fendant physicians but not to plaintiffs. A court analyzing the
rationale and the effects of this provision might conclude that it is
unconstitutional and invalid. Another problematic aspect of the leg-
islation arises from the fact that, in order to integrate the guidelines
legislation and the prelitigation screening panel provisions, the
screening provisions were amended after the enactment of the
guidelines legislation to confer upon the screening panel the author-
ity to resolve the affirmative defense of compliance with the guide-
lines. If this provision is construed to bestow upon the panel the
authority to make determinations as a matter of law, thereby divest-
ing plaintiffs of the right of access to both the superior court and a
jury, the entire scheme could be found unconstitutional.
The Article concludes with suggestions regarding how the Maine
legislation might be amended to address its procedural and constitu-
tional shortcomings.
II. BACKGROUND
The emergence of physician practice guidelines as a means of cur-
tailing medical malpractice litigation followed a series of national
legislative efforts at medical care reform. Beginning in the 1970s, a
number of states began enacting comprehensive legislative reform
packages to combat what was perceived as a medical malpractice
crisis.7 Physicians and insurance providers declared a "malpractice
7. See, e.g., Neal A. Roth, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Its Causes,
the Effects and Proposed Solutions, 44 INs. CouNs. J. 469 (1977).
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crisis" based on an increase in the number of medical malpractice
claims and the growing size of the verdicts awarded by juries in mal-
practice cases.8 The approaches taken by the various states included
legislation establishing medical malpractice damage limitations,
some of which placed absolute limitations on the total recovery per-
mitted to plaintiffs. Other approaches included statutes limiting the
recovery of non-economic damages,9 legislative provisions establish-
ing medical malpractice screening panels and revising applicable
statutes of limitation, and the development of physician practice
guidelines. 10
The State of Maine was one of a number of jurisdictions to under-
take the enactment of a statutory scheme requiring the submission
of all medical malpractice cases to a prelitigation screening panel."
8. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL. MALPRACTICE 13
(1973).
9. Analysis of the development and constitutionality of medical malpractice dam-
age award caps is beyond the scope of this paper. For further information see gener-
ally Mary Ann Willis, Limitation on Recovery of Damages in Medical Malpractice
Cases: A Violation of Equal Protection?, 54 U. CN. L REv. 1329 (1986).
10. Although the scope of this Comment is limited to analyzing the use of physi-
dan practice guidelines in the context of medical malpractice litigation, it is worth
noting the growing criticism and doubt regarding physician practice guidelines in
general. A resolution adopted at the American Medical Association's December
1992 semi-annual meeting stated that there is no evidence that guidelines have any
impact on malpractice costs. See MEDICAL OuTcohms AND GumwI.in s SOURCE
BOOK (Spencer Vibbert & John Reichard eds., 2d ed. 1993). Much concern has been
expressed regarding the inconsistency and variability among guidelines emanating
from different sources within the medical profession. See, eg., Karen Sandrick, Out
in Front Managed Care Helps Push Clinical Guidelines Fonard, Hosp., May 5,1993
at 30.
In addition, practice guidelines opponents cite a lack of evidence to support the
proposition that clinical practice guidelines actually improve care rendered to pa-
tients. There is some fear that guidelines will result in a lowering in the quality of
care provided by clinicians whose hands may be tied from trying technologically
advanced treatments. The same opponents argue that the physician guidelines can-
not capture the nuances of individual patients' circumstances and simply fall short of
providing any real guidance to most clinical situations. See David L Schriger et al.,
The Origins, Benefits, Harms and Implications of Emergency Medicine Clinical Poli-
cies, 22 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 597, 599 (1993). Moreover, many are con-
cerned that physicians will place too much reliance on guidelines and ultimately lose
their capacity to deal with unique situations which commonly arise in the practice of
medicine. Id. A different viewpoint argues that the guidelines may compromise the
ethical status of the doctor-patient relationship. See John E. Wennberg, Unwanted
Variations in the Rules of Practice, 265 JAMA 1306, 1307 (1991). The scientific va-
lidity of guidelines, including the methods by which they have been formulated, has
been criticized. It has been argued that guidelines have the potential to create
"cookbook medicine," thus reducing the "art" of medicine. See Stephen M. Merz,
Clinical Practice Guidelines: Policy Issues and Legal Implications, 19 THE JOINT
CONU'N J. ON QUALITY IMPRovE MENT 306, 307 (1993). Nonetheless, the number
and scope of practice guidelines have increased significantly in recent years.
11. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2851-2859 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993-1994).
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Review of the mechanics and implications of this legislation clarifies
the impact of physician practice guidelines on medical malpractice
litigation. The purpose of the legislation, effective January 1, 1987,
is:
A. To identify claims of professional negligence which merit
compensation and to encourage early resolution of those
claims prior to commencement of a lawsuit; and
B. To identify claims of professional negligence and to en-
courage early withdrawal or dismissal of nonmeritorious
claims. 12
Significantly, the panel process is mandatory unless waived by all
parties to an action.
To initiate any action against a health care provider, the prelitiga-
tion screening panel enactment requires the filing of a notice of
claim, rather than a complaint.'3 The effect of this notice, served
upon the physician-defendant, is to stay the applicable statute of
limitations and to begin the running of the 180-day period within
which the panel is to convene, decide the merits of the claim, and
issue its findings.
During the panel process, full discovery is permitted.' 4 All dis-
covery, including the notice of claim itself, depositions, and interrog-
atories, is protected from public disclosure and is entirely
confidential. At the close of discovery, a hearing is convened before
the designated panel. The panel is made up of a retired judge,'- an
attorney, and, if possible, a medical practitioner in the same spe-
cialty as the defendant.' 6 The panel is charged with determining:
(1) whether the acts complained of constitute a deviation from the
applicable standard of care by the health care practitioner; (2)
whether the acts complained of proximately caused the plaintiff's
injury; and (3) if the health care practitioner was negligent, whether
any negligence by the patient was equal to or greater than the negli-
gence of the health care provider.'7 One of the curious aspects of
the panel process, especially when considered in light of the legisla-
tion's purpose, is the effect given to the panel's ultimate conclusions.
If the panel unanimously finds that the health care practitioner was
negligent and proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries, the fact of
12. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2851(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993-1994).
13. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2853(1) (West 1990).
14. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2853(4), 2857(3) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993-
1994).
15. According to the legislation as initially passed, the chairperson was intended
to be a retired justice of the superior court. Due to the small number of retired
justices in Maine, however, and to the resulting delay in the screening panel process,
the chairperson may now be any member of the bar appointed by the Chief Justice
of the Superior Court and approved by the parties to the action.
16. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2852(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993-1994).
17. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2855(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993-1994).
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the panel and its findings are admissible in a subsequent trial before
a jury. In comparison, a non-unanimous finding is not admissible in
any manner in a subsequent trial. Regardless of the result at the
panel level, a plaintiff may proceed to trial.
The prelitigation screening panel process incorporates several
traditional standards of medical malpractice actions, including plac-
ing the burden on the plaintiff to prove by expert medical testimony
(1) the appropriate standard of medical care; (2) that the defendant
departed from that recognized standard; and (3) that the conduct in
violation of the standard was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury."8 The medical practitioner is held to a national standard of
care.
19
The enactment of Maine's prelitigation screening panel legislation
coincided with a number of other developments in the realm of
health care cost containment. Such developments included certain
research results regarding outcomes and variations in physician
practices,2 0 as well as a growing concern with regard to increasing
malpractice litigation and associated costs. These forces influenced
a movement encouraging the development of physician practice pa-
rameters, which was motivated at least in part by the belief that
properly constructed practice guidelines could eliminate inappropri-
ate treatment, thereby decreasing the cost of medical care. These
"parameters," or clinical practice guidelines, have been defined as
"systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and pa-
tient decisions about appropriate health care for a specific clinical
18. See Cox v. DelaCruz, 406 A.2d 620,622 (Me. 1979) (judgment n.o.v. for phy-
sician-defendant upheld due to plaintiff's failure to produce expert testimony in re-
gard to standard of care and deviation from it). See also Caron v. Pratt, 336 A.2d
856, 860 (Me. 1975).
19. See Taylor v. Hill, 464 A.2d 938, 943 (Me. 1983) (when a physician holds
himself out as a specialist, he is held to the same standard of care of all physicians in
that specialty). See also Hall v. Hilburn, 466 So.2d 856, 873 (Miss. 1985).
20. See M. R. Chassin et al., Variations in the Use of Medical and Surgical Services
by the Medicare Population, 314 NEw ENrG. J. Mm. 285 (1986). See also Troyen A.
Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Collision or Cohesion?, 16
J. HEALTm PoL., PoL'Y & L. 67 (1991) (citations omitted).
21. Schriger, supra note 10, at 598. It is worth noting, however, that although the
claim has been made that the American Society of Anesthesiologists Guidelines for
monitoring general anesthesia has "prevented the occurrence of hypoxic brain dam-
age" and has "led to a reduction of malpractice premiums for anesthesiologists,"
Matthew Liang, From America: Cookbook Medicine of Food for Thought" Practice
Guidelines Development in the U.S.A., 51 ANNALS OF RHEUMATOLOGY DIsPATCH
1257 (1992), the actual reduction in overall national anesthesiology insurance rates
has not been clearly shown. In Maine, a half percent reduction in one insurance
carrier's premiums was ordered by the Insurance Commission in 1992, a direct result
of the Demonstration Project and related practice guidelines. Interview with
Gordon Smith, Maine Hospital Association Counsel, in Augusta, Me. (Mar. 31,
1994).
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circunstance,"22 and have generally been "intended to serve as tools
by which scientifically valid and reliable standards of clinical prac-
tice can be implemented."23 Use of guidelines has been viewed as a
means of reducing the practice of "defensive medicine"'24 as well as
a means of decreasing variation in medical care by educating physi-
cians about processes demonstrated to have satisfactory outcomes.
The State of Maine embraced the philosophy that physician prac-
tice guidelines were a means worth pursuing toward the ends of high
quality health care and cost reduction. In a pioneering effort, a coa-
lition formed for the single purpose of designing a plan to achieve
this goal drafted a proposal known as the Medical Liability Demon-
stration Project.2' The Demonstration Project included a legislative
scheme incorporating physician practice guidelines into Maine's
medical malpractice litigation proceedings, and required the estab-
lishment of "risk management protocols... designed to avoid mal-
practice claims and increase the defensibility of the malpractice
claims that are pursued."26
As proposed, the guidelines legislation provided that physicians
would be granted immunity from suit upon a showing of compliance
with the approved guidelines. The final version of the project was
22. Robert S. A. Hayward et al., More Informative Abstracts of Articles Describ.
ing Clinical Practice Guidelines, 118 ANNALs OF INTERNAL MED. 731 (1993) (cita-
tion omitted).
23. Brian S. Mittman et al., Implementing Clinical Practice Guidelines: Social In-
fluence Strategies and Practitioner Behavior Change, QuAREmRLY REv. BuLL. 413
(Dec. 1992).
24. Some doubt has been cast on the view that the practice of defensive
medicine, allegedly attributable to fears of malpractice litigation, is a significant fac-
tor in the rising cost of health care. The most widely cited estimate attributed only
1% of medical expenditures in 1984 to defensive medicine. Roger A. Reynolds et
al., The Cost of Medical Professional Liability, 257 JAMA 2776 (1987). One expert
has stated that "even if defensive medicine were zero in 1940, its growth can only
account for a trivial fraction of the expenditure increase." J. Newhouse, Medical
Care Costs: How Much Welfare Loss?, 6 J. OF ECON. PERsP. 3 (1992). Another has
opined that if the system of medical malpractice law were restructured, "much of
defensive medicine would probably still be provided for reasons other than concerns
about malpractice." CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PROJECTIONS OF NATIONAL
HEALTH EXPENDIrruRES 12 (1992); President's Proposal on Health Care Reform and
the Fiscal Year 1993 Health and Human Services Budget: Hearings Before House
Committee on Ways and Means, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 300, 335-38 (1992) (citing
testimony of Robert D. Reischauer, Director, Congressional Budget Office). De-
spite these and other similar assessments, medical malpractice tort reforn, including
steps designed to curtail "defensive medicine," has been proposed and implemented
on both the state and national level.
25. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-79 (West Supp. 1993-1994). The Dem-
onstration Project was actually only one portion of a medical malpractice tort re-
form package that included a "collateral source rule" provision, amendments to
certain medical malpractice discovery rules, and the establishment of a rural access
initiative involving funding for obstetrics physicians in rural areas. L.D. 2513 (114th
Legis. 1990).
26. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2973 (West Supp. 1993-1994).
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adopted by the Legislature in the early morning hours of the closing
1990 legislative session and was the subject of little discussion.' In-
troduction to consideration of the bill included the explanation that
three medical specialties would be responsible for developing prac-
tice parameters which were to "be designed to help avoid future
malpractice claims and to decrease the cost of defensive medicine" 2
and "help to reduce the costly battle with experts that often occurs
in malpractice cases."2 9 In addition, it was offered that a physician
who elects to participate could introduce as an affirmative defense
evidence of compliance with the protocols in the event that he or
she should be sued in the future. Although there is no legislative
record reflecting the process and rationale that led to this result, the
initially proposed immunity had been revised to an affirmative de-
fense.31 It has been suggested that the Judiciary Committee, when
presented with the initial immunity proposal, was simply not com-
fortable with such a concept.32 Presumably the Committee found
insufficient justification for elevating physicians to the status of pro-
tected government officials, who enjoy at least qualified immunity
from suit.
The practice guidelines enactment, as passed, provides (in perti-
nent part):
In any claim for professional negligence against a physician or
the employer of a physician... in which a violation of a stan-
dard of care is alleged, only the physician or the physician's
employer may introduce into evidence, as an affirmative de-
fense, the existence of the practice parameters and risk man-
agement protocols developed and adopted pursuant to § 2973
for that medical specialty area.33
The enactment also states: "Any physician or physician's employer
who pleads compliance with the practice parameters ... as an af-
firmative defense to a claim for professional negligence has the bur-
den of proving that the physician's conduct was consistent with
those parameters .... "'
27. Significant debate focused on the section of the bill regarding the collateral
source rule and on the fact that the final version of the bill lacked a cap on the
recoverable damages allowed in medical malpractice cases. Legis. Rec. H756-70
(1990).
28. Id. at 756.
29. Id.
30. Id (emphasis added).
31. Notwithstanding the lack of such a provision in the legislation, some public
misperception apparently exists that the enactment does provide immunity. See,
e.g., Merz, supra note 10, at 308.
32. Interview with Gordon Smith, Maine Hospital Association Counsel, in Au-
gusta, Me. (Mar. 15, 1994).
33. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(1) (West Supp. 1993-1994) (emphasis
added).
34. ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(2) (West Supp. 1993-1994).
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Practice guidelines adopted by the specific medical specialties in-
volved in the Maine Demonstration Project share the same funda-
mental goals as practice guidelines followed in other states. These
include addressing the escalating costs of health care, 5 reducing the
practice of defensive medicine,16 curtailing conflicting expert testi-
mony in medical malpractice litigation,3 7 and improving the quality
of care provided to patients.38
The Maine protocols were formulated with the belief that such
guidelines would reduce any tendency by physicians to order tests
and perform procedures strictly as a shield from potential malprac-
tice suits. It was anticipated by participants in the Demonstration
Project, as well as drafters of the legislation, that physicians follow-
ing practice guidelines would be free to practice quality medicine
without engaging in unnecessary, expensive procedures.
39
Maine's physician practice guidelines were the first in any jurisdic-
tion designed with the specific intention of incorporation into medi-
cal malpractice legislation."n The guidelines referenced and adopted
into the Maine statute 4' are comprised of revised versions of the
national standards of three medical specialties and their respective
national organizations-the American Society of Anesthesiologists
(ASA), the American College of Radiology (ACR), and the Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG).42 In addi-
35. Gordon H. Smith, A Case Study in Progress: Practice Guidelines and the Af-
firmative Defense in Maine, 19 Tim JOINT COMM'N J. ON QUALrrv IMPROVEMErr
356 (1993).
36. ld.
37. Brennan, supra note 20, at 73.
38. Marilyn J. Field, Overview: Prospects and Options for Local and National
Guidelines in the Courts, 19 THE JoINrr COMM'N J. ON QUALrrY IMROVEmNr 313
(1993).
39. GAO REPORT supra note 5, at 3 ("Maine officials expect that the practice
guidelines demonstration project will increase physicians' motivation to perform
medically unnecessary diagnostic tests and treatment procedures .... ").
40. See generally Adam Wolff, Practice Parameters in Health Reform: New State
Approaches Precede Clinton Plan, 21 THE J. OF L., MED. & ETHics 394 (1994).
Florida, Minnesota, Maryland, and Vermont have enacted health care reform legis-
lation contemplating the use of practice guidelines. As of June 1993, guidelines had
not yet been approved in Florida or Minnesota. Vermont's legislation allows state-
sanctioned guidelines to be used as evidence of the standard of care. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 7003 (1992). See also GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 1. Vermont's
statute does not allow providers to plead compliance with the guidelines as an af-
firmative defense to a malpractice claim.
41. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2972 (West Supp. 1993-1994).
42. The guidelines were prepared by committees formed by members of each
particular specialty who used established national guidelines and incorporated
changes the members felt appropriate for the specific practice and geographic areas.
A primary concern was that physicians in smaller hospitals and rural areas not be
required to follow the same procedures, and use the same technological equipment
as, for example, Maine Medical Center, when they might not have such devices and
equipment available. GAO REPORT, supra note 5.
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tion, a group of emergency room physicians created their own
protocols regarding: (1) cervical spine x-rays for acute trauma pa-
tients, (2) documentation of instructions to patients upon discharge,
and (3) transferring patients pursuant to the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (C.O.B.R.A.)1 3
The anesthesiology guidelines govern preanesthesia evaluation
and documentation; standards for intraoperative monitoring includ-
ing oxygenation, ventilation, circulatory function, and physiologic
status; and criteria for preoperative testing." The obstetrics guide-
lines contain ten detailed practice parameters regarding cesarean
deliveries, hysterectomies, tocolysis, ectopic pregnancies, breech de-
liveries, perinatal herpes simplex virus infections, intrapartum fetal
distress, and prolonged pregnancy." The radiology guidelines gov-
ern screening mammography, antepartum ultrasound, outpatient
angiography, and the performance of adult barium enema examina-
tions.4 Each of these three specialties include in their guidelines an
"extenuating circumstance" exception for cases in which it would
not be either medically necessary or appropriate to follow the par-
ticular parameters. The radiology guidelines, however, state, "[T]he
ultimate judgment regarding the propriety of any specific procedure
or course of conduct must be made by the radiologist in light of all
circumstances presented by the individual situation."'47
Subsequent to the enactment of the guidelines legislation and the
completion of the incorporated practice parameters, it became ap-
parent that, unless the prelitigation screening panel provisions were
amended to incorporate instructions on the treatment of the affirm-
ative defense of compliance with the guidelines, the Demonstration
Project would be rendered meaningless. Without integration into
the prelitigation screening panel provisions, the defense of compli-
ance could only be used at trial-well after the physician-defendant
had completed the prelitigation screening panel process. To solve
these problems the affirmative defense would have to be injected
into the medical malpractice legislation and the scope of the panel's
authority would have to be enlarged. Without such amendment, the
panel had no jurisdiction to hear or decide any dispositive legal af-
firmative defenses except comparative negligence, absent the agree-
ment of the parties. The necessary amendment, as enacted,
specifically expanded the panel's jurisdiction to resolve dispositive
legal affirmative defenses to include the issue of:
[C]ompliance with practice parameters or risk management
protocols adopted under Section 2973 if the defendant is a
43. 7 Me. Code of Rules § 02 373 022 (1991).
44. 7 Me. Code of Rules § 02 373 020 (1991).
45. 7 Me. Code of Rules § 02 373 024 (1991).
46. 7 Me. Code of Rules § 02 373 026 (1991).
47. Id at Introduction.
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participant in the medical liability demonstration project es-
tablished under subchapter IX and intends to introduce evi-
dence of compliance at trial ....4
The panel also was charged with determining, in addition to the is-
sues of negligence and causation, "whether the defendant complied
with an applicable parameter or protocol establishing the applicable
standard of care." 49
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MAINE LEGISLATION
While a case testing the effectiveness of the guidelines legislation
has yet to materialize,50 the potential benefits, practical realities,
and limitations of the statutory scheme should be acknowledged.
Observers remain optimistic that the guidelines enactment will fore-
close litigation against a physician or at least avoid significant steps
in the defense process. In an explanation offered on national news
coverage of the project, ABC News reporter Dr. Timothy Johnson
described the legislation as a direct attack on the problem of defen-
sive medicine and declared, "If doctors [follow] the guidelines.., a
malpractice lawsuit against them would be dismissed even if there is
a birth complication."'5 1 The news coverage representation also con-
cluded that, "[Y]ou simply say, 'I met the standard.' And as long as
you can show evidence that you did, you're out of the case."5"
This public perception and expectation is troubling in that it fails
to take into account: (1) the legislation, which provides merely an
affirmative defense, not immunity, does not shield physicians from
Maine's prelitigation screening panel process and provides no guar-
antee with respect to avoiding trial; (2) inconsistencies in the legisla-
tive provisions may undermine certain goals of the enactment; and
(3) the legislation may be vulnerable to constitutional challenges
which, in addition to potentially invalidating certain legislative pro-
visions in the project or in the prelitigation screening panel legisla-
tion, could complicate and prolong the judicial process involved in
defending a medical malpractice claim.
48. ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2853(5) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993-1994).
49. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2855 (A-1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993-1994).
50. Although much has been made of Maine's pioneering efforts to test the phy-
sician-defendants' use of practice guidelines against malpractice charges, more than
one and a half years into the project there is yet to be a case in which the guidelines
can be applied. It is likely that the Project will remain untested, given the slight
chance that during the five year Project period, which expires on January 1, 1997,
any case will arise which would invoke the use of the guidelines.
51. World News Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 4,
1993) available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, ABCNEW File.
52. Id (quoting Gordon Smith, Maine Hospital Association counsel).
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A. Potential for Success of the Affirmative Defense
Although the legislation may have certain shortcomings, there is a
small window of cases within which the affirmative defense of "com-
pliance" will offer a degree of protection to physician-defendants
faced with defending themselves against an otherwise lengthy, com-
plex medical malpractice action. This window, which would poten-
tially shorten but not preclude a lawsuit, is only available if.
1. The physician-defendant was a participant in the Demon-
stration Project;
2. The action or inaction by the physician-defendant that
constitutes the basis for the claim of malpractice clearly falls
within, and is governed by, the legislatively incorporated prac-
tice guidelines;
3. The affirmative defense of compliance is asserted at the
panel stage (or the panel is mutually waived) and is presented
in a motion for summary judgment;
4. The panel chairperson agrees to submit the issue to the
superior court for resolution by a superior court justice;
5. There are no material disputed facts and the plaintiff
does not generate any disputed facts regarding sufficient com-
pliance by the physician-defendant with the practice guidelines
or lack of circumstances justifying non-compliance; and
6. The superior court grants summary judgment after re-
view of all documents and affidavits and consideration of argu-
ments in a non-testimonial hearing.
Unfortunately, for the reasons discussed below, it will be the ex-
tremely rare scenario in which all of the above factors are present,
thus allowing the successful intejection of the affirmative defense of
compliance.
B. Inherent Obstacles Presented by the Prelitigation Screening
Panel Provisions
Analysis of a hypothetical medical malpractice action in the con-
text of Maine's legal system illustrates why the mechanism of an
affirmative defense is not likely to trigger the neatly outlined steps
above and will not provide physicians the degree of protection
sought by the legislation. As the hypothetical scenario will illus-
trate, the problem lies not so much with the theory underlying the
legislation, or even with its drafting, as with the existence of the pre-
litigation screening panel requirements. The hypothetical scenario
includes a claim of medical negligence asserted against an anesthesi-
ologist who allegedly failed to ventilate and monitor appropriately a
patient receiving general anesthesia.5 3 In response to the plaintiff's
53. Appendix 1 of Chapter 20 of the Medical Liability Demonstration Project
sets forth the anesthesiology practice parameters and provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) every patient receiving general anesthesia shall have the adequacy of ventila-
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claim, counsel for the physician-defendant raises as an affirmative
defense the physician's compliance with the applicable practice
guidelines. Because the allegation of negligence against the physi-
cian would be pursuant to a notice of claim invoking all of the re-
quirements of the prelitigation screening panel, the assertion of the
affirmative defense under physician guidelines would be subject to
the procedural dictates of the screening panel provisions.
1. An Affirmative Defense at the Panel Stage
The fact that the prelitigation screening panel provisions are una-
voidable significantly undermines the potential for the guidelines
legislation to fulfill its mission of protecting physicians from, and
decreasing generally, medical malpractice litigation. One major
problem lies in the treatment of an affirmative defense in the con-
text of the medical malpractice panel proceedings, given the nature
of the affirmative defense. Technically, an affirmative defense is re-
quired to be pled in the answer to a complaint or it will be deemed
waived." Since the panel proceedings preclude the filing of a com-
plaint in court, the defense cannot be pled in an answer.55 The de-
fining characteristic of an affirmative defense, and the reason it
neither can terminate litigation at the panel stage nor fully protect
physicians from having to defend a lawsuit, is that it constitutes a
triable defense to an action while assuming the facts alleged in the
complaint to be true unless specifically denied.56 It does not provide
immunity.5 7
Once an affirmative defense has been asserted, the burden of
proof shifts to the physician asserting it "in accordance with the gen-
tion continually evaluated (footnote omitted). While qualitative clinical signs such
as chest excursion, observation of the reservoir breathing bag and auscultation of
breath sounds may be adequate, quantitative monitoring of the CO2 content and/or
volume of expired gas is encouraged." 7 Me. Code of Rules § 02 373 020, at 8
(1991).
54. ME. R. Crv. P. 8(c); 12(b). See also Bartlett v. Pullen, 586 A.2d 1263, 1265
(Me. 1991); Sargent v. Sargent, 622 A.2d 721 (Me. 1993) (res Judicata claimed re-
garding fraud allegation following divorce); RicRDi H. FmL ET AL., MAINE
Civi. PAcricE § 8.18 (Supp. 1981) (discussing affirmative defense of res judicata).
The only exception to this is if the trial court finds the issue to have been tried by
implied consent. See Maine Mortgage Co. v. Tonge, 448 A.2d 899, 901-02 (Me.
1982).
55. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2859 (West Supp. 1993-1994).
56. See BLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY 55 (5th ed. 1979); 71 CJ.S. Pleadings § 158
(1951).
57. It has been suggested that the decision to inject the affirmative defense,
rather than immunity, into the legislation was not viewed as problematic, or even as
a real compromise. Instead, there was a belief that whether the mechanism was
immunity or an affirmative defense, the same procedures would be necessary. In
other words, it made no difference since the prelitigation screening panel procedures
would still have to be followed, and the same standards would be applicable to
either defense. Interview with Gordon Smith, supra note 32.
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eral rule of evidence which places the burden of proving the affirma-
tive of an issue upon the party alleging the facts constituting it and
relying thereon."' 8 The phrase "burden of proof" means both the
burden of persuasion as well as the burden of producing evidence.
This incorporates:
(1) [t]he peculiar duty of him who has the risk of any given
proposition on which parties are at issue, who will lose the
case if he does not make this proposition out, when all has
been said and done... [and] (2) [i]t stands for the duty ... of
going forward in argument or in producing evidence; whether
at the beginninZ of the case or at any later moment throughout
the trial ....
Thus, the physician-defendant has the burden of proving compliance
with the physician guidelines once the affirmative defense is
asserted.
2. The Affirmative Defense in Summary Judgment Proceedings
The method by which a physician-defendant attempts to meet the
applicable burden of proof will take the form of a motion for sum-
mary judgment.60 In accordance with the Maine Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, a physician asserting the affirmative defense of compliance
will be deemed to have met the applicable burden of proof by sub-
mitting his or her own affidavit, based upon personal knowledge,
that he or she complied with the applicable guidelines. Only in the
most unusual circumstances would such a motion for summary judg-
ment justify dismissal of the action against the physician. This is due
to the reluctance of superior court judges to grant motions for sum-
58. 1 AMt. Jug. 2D Accord and Satisfaction § 55; see generally Windle v. Jordan, 75
Me. 149 (1883) (defendant held to have burden of proof on defense that plaintiff was
warned of vicious propensity of horse). See also Cox v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 139 Me. 167, 169-170 (Me. 1942) (defendant insurance company had burden to
prove claim of suicide to avoid payment of policy).
59. JAmEs B. THAYER, A PRELmliNARY TRAnrisn ON EVDENCE AT THE COm.-
MON LAW 355 (1896).
60. Typically, an affirmative defense may be pursued by a motion for judgment
on the pleadings or a motion to dismiss pursuant to ME. R. CIV. P. 12(c), see e.g.,
Chiapetta v. Clark Assoc., 521 A.2d 697, 700 (Me. 1987), or via a motion for sum-
mary judgment pursuant to ME. R. Civ. P. 56. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is appropri-
ate to raise an affirmative defense only if the facts establishing the defense appear
on the face of the complaint. See Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 290
A.2d 362, 367-68 (Me. 1972) (denial of motion to dismiss based upon statute of
limitations upheld because matters presented outside the pleadings transformed the
motion into one for summary judgment, which was precluded by existence of dis-
puted facts); Patten v. Milam, 468 A.2d 620, 621 (Me. 1983) (rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
based upon grounds of res judicata upheld). Because any motion to dismiss based
upon the issue of compliance with the physician practice guidelines will necessarily
require an affidavit, the motion will be treated as one for summary judgment. See
Waterville Homes, Inc. v. Maine Dep't of Transp., 589 A.2d 455, 457 (Me. 1991).
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mary judgment6 ' as well as to the peculiar nature of the affirmative
defense of compliance. Moreover, denial of a motion for summary
judgment based on the affirmative defense of compliance would be
considered an interlocutory ruling, and not appealable, unless an ex-
ception to the final judgment rule were found to apply.62
It is difficult to imagine a set of facts upon which compliance with
the anesthesiology protocol would resolve all questions regarding
compliance with the appropriate standard of care as a matter of law.
One major obstacle is that the protocol itself raises questions with
respect to the appropriate measures to be taken in the face of partic-
ular clinical signs. Specifically, a physician may claim to have com-
plied with the practice guidelines by observing clinical signs such as
chest excursion and auscultation of breath sounds in reaching a con-
clusion that the patient was adequately ventilated. Depending upon
the circumstances of the case, however, additional steps such as
quantitative monitoring of the CO2 content or volume of expired gas
might have been required.63 In other instances, the "extenuating
circumstances" exception could be invoked making the entire guide-
line inapplicable.' 4 Thus, the language of the protocol is inherently,
albeit necessarily, ambiguous.
The physician practice guidelines as applied in this hypothetical
example do not, and cannot, paint a bright-line test for compliance
with the medical standard of care. Further, it should be anticipated
that merely raising the affirmative defense of compliance will not be
dispositive of the legal issue of the standard of care. This is not to
suggest that the particular guidelines under discussion are flawed.
Instead, it is a recognition of the fact that decisions of medical care
rest upon the nuances and facts of each particular case. Accord-
ingly, a court faced with a motion for summary judgment based
upon compliance with the guidelines will likely be constrained from
ruling in the physician-defendant's favor. This is due, in addition to
the ambiguities inherent in the language of the guidelines, to the
challenges the plaintiff will raise to the motion.65 Summary judg-
61. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has stated on
several occasions that summary judgment motions are to be granted with caution,
and should only be used in the rare, extreme circumstances when the lack of any
disputed facts and a clear legal conclusion warrant entry of judgment as a matter of
law. See, e.g., Chadwick-BaRoss Inc. v. T. Buck Constr. Co., 627 A.2d 532,534 (Me.
1993); Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 468 A.2d 315, 317
(Me. 1983); Wallingford v. Butcher, 413 A.2d 162, 165 (Me. 1980).
62. See Dep't of Human Services v. Lowatchie, 569 A.2d 197, 199-200 (Me. 1990)
(allowing interlocutory appeal in paternity action based on judicial economy excep-
tion to final judgment rule).
63. See supra note 48.
64. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
65. Opposition to a motion for summary judgment may be made by witness affi-
davits, answers to interrogatories, responses to requests for admissions, or even
through certified medical records. See ME. R. Civ. P. 56.
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ment is properly granted only if no genuine issue of material fact
remains and the moving party is entitled to such judgment as a mat-
ter of law.' A plaintiff will undoubtedly seek to convince the court
that disputed facts exist so as to preclude the entry of summary
judgment.67 The very nature of the affirmative defense of compli-
ance may lead plaintiffs to (1) question whether the guidelines actu-
ally meet the appropriate national standard of care; (2) refute the
physician's claim of compliance; or (3) indicate that the particular
circumstances in the case did not justify following the particular
guidelines raised in the affirmative defense but instead fell within an
exception to the guidelines. For example, the plaintiffs in the anes-
thesiology hypothetical could claim that quantitative monitoring of
the CO2 content was necessary under the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of the case.
It is worth noting that the plain language of section 2855 and the
inference that can be drawn therefrom suggests that the drafters of
this provision envisioned resolution, not at the summary judgment
stage, but after a full hearing before the panel. The provision ex-
pressly authorizes the panel to decide after hearing whether the de-
fendant complied with an applicable parameter.6 Thus, even
summary judgment proceedings may present an unsuccessful avenue
for resolution of the affirmative defense of compliance. The bottom
line is that assertion of the affirmative defense does not necessarily
avoid the physician-defendant having to proceed with the entire
screening panel process. The most likely scenario is that the affirm-
ative defense will not be ruled upon until the panel has fully and
completely considered all of the evidence and testimony.
C. Inherent Shortcomings in the Practice Guidelines
Statutory Scheme
As discussed above, there are certain theoretical obstacles
presented by raising the affirmative defense of compliance in the
context of a summary judgment motion at the prelitigation panel
stage. The incorporation of the affirmative defense of compliance
with physician practice guidelines into the prelitigation screening
panel provisions also is problematic, for three logistical reasons.
First, the affirmative defense and the practice guidelines could be
used against the physician-defendant, notwithstanding the express
instruction in the Demonstration Project that only the physician-de-
fendant is permitted to raise the issue of compliance. The second
problem lies in the non-exclusive nature of the panel's consideration
66. See Saltonstall v. Cumming, 538 A.2d 289, 290 (Me. 1988) (lower court grant
of summary judgment vacated because Law Court found disputed facts existed re-
garding easement referenced in a deed).
67. See ME. R. Crv. P. 56(c).
68. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2855(I)(A) (Vest 1990).
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of the affirmative defense of compliance. Third, as a practical mat-
ter, the practice guidelines are not likely to obviate the need for
expert testimony on the applicable standard of care.
1. Exculpatory Use of the Evidence of Compliance
with Guidelines
Much of the support garnered from the medical community for
the Demonstration Project can be traced to the fact that the affirma-
tive defense is intended to be used for exculpatory purposes only.
The statute allows a plaintiff to use evidence regarding compliance
with physician practice guidelines only "[i]f the physician or the phy-
sician's employer introduces at trial evidence of compliance with the
parameters and protocols ... ."69 The screening panel provisions
which govern the claim against the physician, however, undermine
this aim of section 2975. The provisions may allow plaintiffs to
avoid the legislature's desire that they use evidence regarding physi-
cian guidelines only in narrow circumstances.
If the hypothetical anesthesiologist referenced earlier asserts com-
pliance with an applicable guideline, but the panel unanimously
finds in favor of the plaintiff, such a finding would be admissible
against the physician in a subsequent trial.70 The panel could find in
favor of the plaintiff by concluding that the physician-defendant did
not comply with the guidelines, or that the circumstances of the case
justified deviation from the protocol, or that the physician-defend-
ant was otherwise negligent. Yet, no matter how the panel arrives at
its conclusion, the prelitigation screening panel provisions require
all unanimous findings to be revealed to a jury.71 Thus, notwith-
standing the intent of the guidelines legislation that the affirmative
defense be available for exculpatory purposes only, there is risk to
the physician-defendant that the defense could be used against him
at trial.
69. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(2) (West Supp. 1993-1994) (emphasis
added). Although the prelitigation screening panel legislation was amended to al-
low consideration of the defense by the panel, the Demonstration Project provision
(section 2975) has not been amended to reflect that change and only indicates that
the plaintiff may present rebuttal evidence at trial. Presumably, that is not the legis-
lature's intent. If the defendant raises the defense of compliance at the panel stage
(and not just at trial) the plaintiff would be permitted to present evidence on the
issue before the panel.
70. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2857(1)(A) (West 1990).
71. See Sullivan v. Johnson, 628 A.2d 653, 656 (Me. 1993) (holding that the stat-
ute states that the unanimous conclusions shall be admissible "without explanation";
the jury may be advised as to the results of the panel proceedings; and that the panel
process is a preliminary procedural step through which malpractice claims proceed).
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2. The Non-Exclusive Findings Regarding Compliance
with Guidelines
Another aspect of the prelitigation screening panel legislation
with critical implications for a physician-defendant asserting the af-
firmative defense of "compliance" is that the panel's consideration
of the defense is not exclusive and a plaintiff is not precluded from
pursuing the negligence and causation prongs of the malpractice
claim. In other words, the hypothetical anesthesiologist who raises
the affirmative defense of compliance is not automatically dismissed
from the suit.
The prelitigation screening panel legislation requires the panel to
determine first whether the physician complied with applicable
guidelines, second whether the physician was negligent, and third, if
the physician was negligent, whether the negligence was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries.7" It appears that compliance with
the guidelines does not preclude the determination of the negligence
and compliance issues.73 Thus, a unanimous ruling in the physi-
cian's favor after the panel hearing on the compliance issue does not
necessarily preclude the panel's ruling against the physician on the
negligence and causation issues.
This seemingly inconsistent result may be explained in the context
of a plaintiff's challenge to the appropriateness of adhering to a par-
ticular practice parameter. The prelitigation panel could find that
although the physician complied with the applicable guideline, an
exception existed which justified deviation from the standard. If the
legislation were drafted so that a finding of compliance precluded
any further inquiry, it would be inconsistent with the nature of an
affirmative defense, in that the plaintiff would be unable to contest
the compliance defense. In effect, a finding in a physician-defend-
ant's favor on the compliance prong, if conclusive at the panel stage,
would be tantamount to immunity: the physician would not be ex-
posed under the legislation's negligence and causation prongs.
72. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2855 (Vest 1990 & Supp. 1993-1994).
73. Subsection (A-1), the compliance prong of section 2855, is not followed by
the word "or." This allows the inference that even if the defense of compliance is
raised, the panel must still determine separately the negligence and causation issues.
Specifically, the statute reads:
If the defendant is a participant in the medical liability demonstration pro-
ject established under subchapter IX and has raised as an affirmative de-
fense compliance with the practice parameters or risk management
protocols adopted under section 2973, whether the defendant complied
with an applicable parameter or protocol establishing the applicable stan-
dard of care;
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2855(1)(A-1) (West Supp. 1993-1994).
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3. Use of Experts
Although it has been suggested that physician practice guidelines
could be used as evidence to establish an applicable standard of care
without the need for accompanying medical expert testimony,74 sev-
eral obstacles may impede this laudable goal. For instance, defense
experts may be necessary to explain the guidelines and justify their
admissibility as conclusive evidence of a standard of care.75
An additional need for expert testimony arises in the context of a
plaintiff's claim that a certain guideline is not the appropriate stan-
dard of care under the particular facts and circumstances of the case.
Such a claim would incorporate challenges to the up-to-date nature
of the guideline, whether a different guideline (by a separate medi-
cal entity or organization) were preferable, or whether the facts of
the case justified application of one of the exceptions to the
guidelines.
The informal nature of the panel stage may make the above sce-
narios irrelevant at a panel hearing, but they would certainly be crit-
ical at trial. Moreover, even prior to a hearing, full discovery,
including interrogatories and depositions of both the parties as well
as of experts, could be allowed on these issues and further impede
the goal of expediting medical malpractice litigation.76
IV. POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
TO THE LEGISLATION
Except for those few cases the may be appropriate for dismissal
based upon compliance with practice guidelines, physician-defend-
ants should be prepared to confront at least two constitutional chal-
lenges to the guidelines legislation, either of which could result in
invalidation of the legislation. First, should the statutory provisions
be deemed to authorize the panel, rather than a judge or jury, to
decide the dispositive legal issue of compliance with physician
guidelines, both Maine and federal constitutional concerns could be
implicated. Second, should a plaintiff seek to utilize evidence re-
garding compliance with practice guidelines offensively, and be
74. See, eg., GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 20. Contra, Brennan, supra note 20
(offering opinion that guidelines would be supplemented by expert testimony).
75. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 20. A related need for experts arises in the
context of the admissibility of the written parameters in the face of hearsay objec-
tions. The hearsay rule, which bars out of court statements offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted, is only overcome by one of a number of exceptions.
The one recognized exception which might apply and which would obviate the need
for expert testimony is a "learned treatise" exception. This exception, however, al-
lows introduction of a statement (here, a practice guideline) only in conjunction with
the testimony of an expert witness. If admitted, "the statements may be read into
evidence but may not be received as exhibits." FED. R. Evm. 803(18).
76. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2853(4), 2857(3) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993-
1994).
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barred from doing so by the provision which allows only defendant
physicians to enter such evidence, a constitutional challenge would
likely be upheld. Any constitutional inquiry would entail an analysis
of whether the panel procedures: (1) constituted an improper usur-
pation of a judicial function; (2) deprived plaintiffs of the right to a
jury trial; or (3) constituted a violation of the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Federal and Maine Constitutions.
A. Resolution of the Affirmative Defense by the Panel
Notwithstanding the express provision of the screening panel leg-
islation which empowers the panel to "resolve the dispositive legal
affirmative defense" of compliance with practice parameters,' the
referenced "resolution" should be interpreted to bestow upon the
panel the authority only to consider the defense of compliance at
hearing and to enter findings on each of the prongs of the statute,
including compliance. If a final judgment were entered in a case
based on a panel determination on the issue of compliance with
practice guidelines, the legislation could be deemed unconstitutional
as an improper usurpation of the judicial process, in that it deprives
a physician-defendant of his or her right to a trial by jury.
A fair reading of the language of the Demonstration Project legis-
lation,78 in conjunction with the amended prelitigation screening
panel provisions,7 9 supports the interpretation that only the superior
court, and not the panel, may decide as a matter of law the disposi-
tive affirmative defense of compliance with physician practice guide-
lines. The legislation, however, allows the panel to "hear and
decide" the affirmative defense of compliance. There is no reason
to believe that this affirmative defense should be treated any differ-
ently from the affirmative defense of comparative negligence, which
is the one other instance where the panel lacks the authority to re-
solve dispositive legal affirmative defenses. For either defense, the
panel is required to enter findings after full hearing rather than at
the summary judgment stage." These findings themselves do not
operate as complete adjudication of the claim, but merely indicate
to the parties what a jury might do at trial. A unanimous finding,
which would be admissible at trial, might compel the parties to
reach a settlement. In any event, the panel's findings on compliance
do not resolve the action but rather constitute one step in a process
that may culminate in a trial.
The plain language of the prelitigation screening panel statute
supports the assertion that the panel's authority to decide the af-
firmative defense of compliance is limited to entering findings at the
77. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 24, § 2853(5) (West Supp. 1993-1994).
78. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-2979 (Vest Supp. 1993-1994).
79. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2851-2859 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993-1994).
80. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 24, § 2855(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993-1994).
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panel stage and does not result in a dismissal of the suit. Specifi-
cally, section 2853 of Title 24 confers on the panel the jurisdiction to
hear or decide the affirmative defense only if the defendant "intends
to introduce evidence of compliance at trial."'" There is no proce-
dure in the statute by which a defendant notifies the panel of such
an intention. Presumably, a defendant raising the affirmative de-
fense at the panel stage intends to follow the same strategy at trial.
The legislation does not discuss the treatment of a defendant who
reserves the right to alter strategies and discard the affirmative de-
fense of compliance for the trial process. Nor does the statute ad-
dress whether defendants who seek to avoid trial altogether by filing
a motion for summary judgment at the panel stage are deemed to
"intend to introduce evidence at trial" if the motion for summary
judgment is denied. In any event, the panel is not authorized to ad-
dress the affirmative defense of compliance for physicians who indi-
cate that the defense will not be raised at trial.
Assuming, arguendo, that a physician-defendant convinced the
panel or the court to dismiss a case using a motion for summary
judgment, based upon a unanimous finding by the panel that the
physician complied with approved practice guidelines, the decision
would be constitutionally suspect. While the goals of the Demon-
stration Project to curtail the length, complexities, and costs of mal-
practice litigation would be served by such a decision, it would likely
fall short of certain constitutional requirements. The most likely
challenges would be based upon either Article III of Maine's Con-
stitution or upon the State and Federal Constitutional guarantees
regarding jury trials.
1. Usurpation of a Judicial Function
Whether the panel chairperson has the authority and jurisdiction
to make a final, binding determination with respect to the affirma-
tive defense of compliance is governed by Article III of the Maine
Constitution, which expressly provides that, "No person or persons,
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any of the
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in the
cases herein expressly directed or permitted." The Maine Consti-
tution also provides, "Every person, for an injury done him in his
person, reputation, property or immunities, shall have remedy by
due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered freely
and without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and with-
out delay."'83
If a panel chairperson construes the screening panel legislation to
bestow upon the panel the authority to decide the issue of compli-
81. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2853(5) (West Supp. 1993-1994).
82. ME. CONST. art. Il, § 2.
83. ME. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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ance with physician practice guidelines as a matter of law, the legis-
lation could be deemed unconstitutional as applied, as it permits
usurpation of a judicial function. If, on the other hand, the panel
restricts its role to deciding the three prongs of the malpractice crite-
ria (compliance, negligence, and causation), and the case is trans-
ferred to the superior court for the litigation stage, as contemplated
by the statute, no constitutional infirmities are implicated. The su-
perior court cannot dismiss a case solely because there was a unani-
mous panel finding of compliance with applicable guidelines. If the
court could dismiss a case for that reason, the panel findings would
be accorded a weight that the legislation neither intended nor in-
structed. Instead, the court should either address a summary judg-
ment motion filed by either party or schedule the case for discovery
and trial. Adherence to these procedures is contemplated by the
legislation and affords litigants their rights with respect to the judi-
cial process.
2. Right to Trial by Jury
The first substantive clause of the Seventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides, "In suits at common law...
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved"' and thus guarantees
the right to a jury trial in civil actions brought in federal courts.
Although the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states, the
Maine Constitution provides, "In all civil suits... the parties shall
have a right to a trial by jury, except in cases where it has heretofore
been otherwise practiced .... ,,"I
Maine's constitutional provision has been construed to safeguard
a litigant's right to a jury trial on all legal claims" except "in cases
where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced."' a The exception
applies to equity cases or when it is affirmatively shown that a jury
trial would not have been available for the particular type of action
in 1820,88 the year Maine's Constitution was adopted. Because the
right to a jury trial did exist prior to 1820 for civil actions related to
medical malpractice, a litigant's right in this area is preserved pursu-
ant to Maine's Article I, section 20. Only if there are no "questions
84. U.S. CONsr. amend. XII.
85. MN. Co Nsr. art. I, § 20.
86. City of Rockland v. Rockland Water Co., 86 Me. 55, 29 A. 935 (1893) (if
equitable powers of the court were enlarged, other than by statute, the right of trial
by jury-available only at law and not in equity-might be improperly narrowed or
denied).
87. ME. CoNsr. art. I, § 20.
88. See Harriman v. Maddocks, 560 A.2d 11, 12 (Me. 1989); see also, Cyr v. Cote,
396 A.2d 1013, 1016 (Me. 1979) (dispute regarding terms of will).
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of fact that the substantive law makes material" may the case be
decided by the court prior to submission to a jury.9
The guidelines legislation should not be construed to allow dispo-
sition of a case without full and proper consideration by either the
superior court on summary judgment9" or by a jury at trial. Any
other construction that results in the dismissal of a suit, when the
dismissal is based solely upon a finding of compliance with a prac-
tice guideline, would be an unconstitutional violation of the right to
trial by jury. While numerous courts have addressed and rejected
Seventh Amendment challenges to medical malpractice legislation
imposing caps on damages awards, 91 no court has been confronted
with a deprivation of jury trial claim in the circumstances potentially
presented by the Maine legislation.
In Boucher v. Sayeed,92 the Rhode Island Supreme Court de-
clared, construing its state constitution in the context of a challenge
to its own medical malpractice prelitigation screening panel enact-
ment, 93 that: "[T]rial by jury is inviolate .... The right is thus
placed absolutely beyond the power of the legislature to alter or
abolish it."' 94 Although the Boucher court did not reach the issue of
whether the Rhode Island revised medical malpractice- screening
panel legislation violated the right to a jury trial,95 the court noted
the unlikelihood of the statute's passing constitutional muster since
"[T]he law, as written, provides no recourse for a plaintiff whose
claim is denied by the hearing justice, thereby infringing upon his
right to a jury trial."9 6
Arguably, the Maine legislation also provides no recourse for a
plaintiff if a medical malpractice claim can be dismissed with preju-
dice upon the mere finding that the physician-defendant complied
89. Peters v. Saft, 597 A.2d 50, 53 (Me. 1991) (quoting English v. New England
Medical Center, 541 N.E2d 329, 331 (Mass. 1989)).
90. Full consideration is intended to mean that the superior court could not grant
summary judgment based on the mere assertion by a defendant physician of compli-
ance with a practice guideline. ME. R. Civ. P. 56.
91. James F. Tiu, Challenging Medical Malpractice Damage Award Caps on Sev-
enth Amendment Grounds: Attacks in Search of a Rationale, 59 U. CN. L. REv. 213
(1990).
92. Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983).
93. The statute, as amended, replaced the medical malpractice screening panel
proceedings with a single trial justice charged with determining whether the "evi-
dence presented by the plaintiff, if properly substantiated and viewed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, would be sufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability
appropriate for judicial inquiry, or whether the plaintiff's case is merely an unfortu-
nate medical result." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-4 (1981) (repealed 1985). If the trialjustice concluded the latter, the action would be dismissed with prejudice. Id.
94. Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d at 91 n.13 (quoting Dyer v. Keefe, 198 A.2d 159,
160 (R.I. 1964)).
95. The Rhode Island statute was held unconstitutional on other grounds, and
thus it was not necessary for the court to reach the jury-trial issue.
96. Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d at 91 n.13.
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with the practice guidelines. A medical malpractice litigant's right
to a jury trial includes a full hearing before a factfinder. The statute
contemplates that the panel will restrict its role to deciding the three
prongs of the malpractice criteria; it should not be construed to al-
low the panel to replace the jury function. Absent a circumstance in
which a case clearly falls within the narrow window discussed earlier
(in which a practice guideline is clearly invoked, a physician-defend-
ant alleges compliance with the guideline, and no facts exist to cre-
ate a dispute regarding that compliance), the matter should be
resolved only after panel hearing and full trial before a jury. If the
statute is so construed, it should survive a challenge that it violates
the constitutional guarantee to a trial by jury.
B. Use of Evidence by Defendants Only
The Demonstration Project was implemented with the specific
purpose and intent of making evidence regarding compliance with
physician practice guidelines available only to physician-defendants.
Plaintiffs' use of this evidence is limited to those circumstances in
which "the physician or the physician's employer introduces at trial
evidence of compliance with the parameters and protocols . .. "I
This aspect of the legislation, that evidence is limited to use by de-
fendants, presents the most constitutionally suspect provision of the
Demonstration Project. If this legislation is invoked, and a panel or
court prohibits a plaintiff from offering evidence or pursuing testi-
mony regarding a physician-defendant's compliance (or lack
thereof) with a guideline, the legislation will likely be challenged as
a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of both
the Federal and State Constitutions.
One Maine legislator has stated the issue simply:
Do you think that one party in an action, be it a trial or be it a
prelitigation screening panel, do you think that one party
ought to be able to introduce evidence that is useful to the fact
finder but the other party should not be able to introduce the
evidence? 98
Although stated as a matter of fairness, the validity of the provision
would depend, if presented to a court, on whether the disparate
treatment of the parties amounted to a violation of the State or Fed-
eral Constitutions.
1. Challenges to the Legislation on Equal Protection Grounds
The Maine Constitution guarantees that, ",[Jo person shall be ...
denied the equal protection of the laws ... ." The critical inquiry
97. M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(2) (West Supp. 1993-1994).
98. Legis. Rec. 1074 (1991) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
99. ME. CONsT. art. I, § 6-A.
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in the face of a claim that legislation violates this guarantee is
whether, depending upon the nature of the right at stake, the "vary-
ing treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [a
court] can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irra-
tional."'"0 Both the nature of the classification and the individual
rights at stake determine the appropriate test to be applied.
A strict scrutiny standard is used when a statute's different treat-
ment of a select class of persons either infringes upon fundamental
rights' 01 or results in the creation of a suspect classification."° In
such circumstances the classification must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling state interest.'0 3 If the classification is not
suspect and does not involve categories of persons based upon race,
alienage, or illegitimacy, for example, and does not impinge upon a
fundamental right such as religion, speech, voting, or procreation,
the appropriate standard to be applied to the legislation is the ra-
tional basis test.'" A statutory classification reviewed under the ra-
tional basis test will be invalidated only if the classification is clearly
arbitrary. According to the United States Supreme Court, the test
of a statute's arbitrariness is whether it rests "upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike."'0 5 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the
Law Court, articulated the rational relationship standard as focusing
on whether the challenged legislation has a legitimate purpose and
whether it was reasonable for the legislature to believe that use of
the challenged classification would promote that purpose. 106 The
100. Houk v. Furman, 613 F. Supp. 1022, 1030 (D. Me. 1985) (quoting Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 332 (1981)).
101. See, eg., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry).
102. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race).
103. See, eg., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (finding that mental retardation is not a "quasi-suspect" classification, but
holding invalid under the rational basis test an ordinance requiring license for group
home); Butler v. Supreme Judicial Court, 611 A.2d 987, 992 n.9 (Me. 1992) (holding
Maine jury-trial fee constitutional).
104. See generally Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (quoting Vance
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)) (upholding on rational basis standard an age-
based classification for mandatory judicial retirement).
105. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (striking down,
under the rational basis test, a discriminatory corporate taxation statute); see also
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (discrimination by gender in applications for ad-
ministrators of probate estates held unconstitutional under rational relationship
test).
106. Foucher v. City of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Me. 1983).
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court has found differential treatment justifiable "if the facts may be
reasonably conceived to justify the distinction."'"
A number of courts considering constitutional challenges to state
legislation regarding medical malpractice litigation have held the en-
actments to a "heightened scrutiny" standard which requires more
rigorous scrutiny than under the traditional rational basis test.les
The rationale underlying the application of this heightened standard
is that the class of affected persons, medical malpractice claimants, is
determined to be "quasi-suspect."' 1 9 In finding medical malpractice
claimants to fall within a quasi-suspect class, the Kansas Supreme
Court concluded that malpractice victims were similar to groups
such as women, illegitimates, minorities, and illegal aliens, all of
whom have been afforded "quasi-suspect" status." 0 The similar
qualities cited by the court for medical malpractice claimants in-
cluded lack of cohesiveness and lack of political organization, both
of which the court found justified additional protections."'
As a general matter, the nature of the classification in the Maine
legislation involving physician practice guidelines is between plain-
tiffs in medical malpractice cases as opposed to plaintiffs in any
other tort litigation. The rights at stake include the entitlement to
use evidence that would be available to litigants in other civil con-
texts to assist plaintiffs in proving a claim. The right to a fair and
impartial trial is implicated if the nature of the process is altered by
the litigant's inability to present relevant, probative evidence.
A survey of the jurisdictions in which equal protection challenges
to tort reform measures in the medical malpractice arena have been
addressed suggests that the classification in the Maine legislation
would be tested according to the rational basis standard. First, it
appears to be the majority view that equal protection challenges to
medical malpractice legislation should be viewed as neither infring-
ing upon a fundamental right nor involving a suspect classifica-
tion."12 The distinction between medical malpractice plaintiffs and
107. Dishon v. Maine State Retirement Sys., 569 A.2d 1216, 1217 (Me. 1990)
(quoting McNicholas v. York Beach Village Corp., 394 A.2d 264, 269 (Me. 1978)).
108. See generally Carson v. Maurer, 424 A2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980); Arneson v.
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978). Compare Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d
102 (Md. 1992) (finding that legislation imposing a "cap" on economic damages re-
coverable by a medical malpractice plaintiff is properly analyzed under the rational
basis test as economic regulation).
109. For example, gender-based classifications have been subjected to heightened
scrutiny. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
110. Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058, 1064 (Kan. 1987).
111. Id. (quoting Howard A. Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensa-
tion Schemes: A Constitutional 'Quid Pro Quo' Analysis to Safeguard Individual Lib-
erties, 18 HARv. J. oN LEGIs., 143, 184, 189 (1981)).
112. See, eg., Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (RI. 1983); Doran v. Priddy, 534 F.
Supp. 30 (D. Kan. 1981); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980); Beatty v.
Akron City Hosp., 424 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio 1981).
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litigants in other civil matters has simply not raised fundamental
constitutional concerns. Second, notwithstanding that other state
courts have applied a heightened scrutiny analysis to medical mal-
practice legislation, the Federal District Court in Maine in Houk v.
Furman"3 determined that the appropriate test to be applied in the
context of an equal protection challenge to the prelitigation notice
requirements contained in Maine's medical malpractice legislation is
the "rational relationship test.""' 4
In Houk the court relied largely upon Maine's explicit refusal to
extend equal protection and due process rights beyond the federal
constitutional norm"15 and was not convinced that the malpractice
litigants fell within any special circumstances warranting a departure
from the rational relationship test." 6 Instead, the court treated the
legislation as social or economic regulation. 17 In order for any
Maine court to apply a heightened scrutiny analysis to the guidelines
legislation, the court would have to find a distinction between the
affected class in these circumstances and the class affected by the
prelitigation notice requirements. In fact, the class is exactly the
same-victims of alleged medical malpractice. The difference is
only in the implications of the legislation and the effects on the liti-
gants' procedural rights. Accordingly, the court would likely follow
the Houk rationale and apply the rational basis test.
Even assuming a Maine court would apply the lowest level of
scrutiny, the rational basis test, to the guidelines legislation, the fact
that it denies plaintiffs use of relevant evidence regarding compli-
ance with guidelines would likely render at least that aspect of the
legislation unconstitutional. The court's inquiry would necessarily
focus upon the legislative intent in imposing evidentiary restrictions
upon medical malpractice plaintiffs. Undoubtedly, one of the major
purposes behind the legislation is "to resolve malpractice claims by
eliminating the need to litigate to establish the standard of care.""'
If this is the goal, using guidelines to establish the standard of care
should be equally applicable to both the plaintiff and the defense.
The legislative record reflects additional purposes of the guide-
lines provisions, one of which is helping "to avoid future malpractice
claims and to decrease the cost of defensive medicine... [and to]
reduce the costly battle with experts that often occurs in malpractice
cases.""' 9 Again, if the use of guidelines in legislation is intended to
achieve these goals, it is unclear why they are not furthered by equal
application to plaintiffs and defendants. It is difficult to define how,
113. 613 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Me. 1985).
114. Id. at 1030.
115. Id. at 1029.
116. Id. at 1028.
117. Id.
118. GAO RFORT, supra note 5, at 3.A.
119. Legis. Rec. H756 (1990).
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if at all, this provision constitutes a "fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation" under the Supreme Court's arbitrari-
ness test. Even the Maine articulation-whether "[the] facts may be
reasonably conceived to justify the distinction"" between medical
malpractice and other tort litigants-would be difficult to meet. It
seems more likely that the provision denying plaintiffs access to evi-
dence would complicate, rather than reduce, litigation by generating
appealable issues.
A comparison of medical malpractice to other categories of litiga-
tion further highlights the questionable justification for the distinc-
tion. No other area of law comes to mind in which plaintiffs would
be prohibited from using relevant evidence regarding standards,
guidelines, or usual and customary practices in similar
circumstances.
Numerous examples, including whether a landlord is aware of na-
tional safety standards regarding handrails for stairs, whether a
manufacturer is knowledgeable regarding the suggested use of
safety devices such as guards for a particular product, and whether a
truck driver is aware of industry standards regarding allowable load
limits for his vehicle, illustrate that, regardless of the incorporation
of the standards followed by a profession or industry into legislation,
the evidence of those standards is probative of whether the defend-
ant acted appropriately under all of the circumstances. The
factfinder is entitled to conclude that the standards are not applica-
ble given the particular nuances of the case or that the defendant
need not have followed the standards in light of the circumstances at
the time of the occurrence. Only medical malpractice plaintiffs,
however, seem to be denied complete use of such evidence. Deny-
ing plaintiffs in medical malpractice litigation this procedural benefit
cannot be supported by a rational basis.
Putting aside momentarily the questionable causal connection be-
tween the primary goals of the physician practice guidelines enact-
ment and the provision which denies plaintiffs the use of evidence
regarding compliance with guidelines, the viability of the provision
may be threatened by the lack of an explanation in the Statement of
Fact as to the rationale or justification for such a provision. The
intent behind the enactment is found only in the limited legislative
record and not in the enactment itself. This could prove fatal, even
under a rational relationship analysis. The Boucher court declined
to speculate about unexpressed state interests behind the amend-
ments to Rhode Island's medical malpractice legislation. The court
pointed out, "Statutes aimed at providing relief in a time of crisis
depend for their validity upon a proper exercise of the police power
and ordinarily contain a declaration of legislative findings of fact
120. Dishon v. Maine State Retirement System, 569 A.2d 1216, 1217 (Me. 1990)
(quoting McNicholas v. York Beach Village Corp., 394 A.2d 264, 269 (Me. 1978)).
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involving the public health, safety, or morals."' 21 The Statement of
Fact 22 for Maine's guidelines legislation merely reflects that the
practice parameters will be developed by particular specialty com-
mittees and that the protocols may be used by a physician as an
affirmative defense in a claim for professional negligence. 23 If a
Maine court addressing the lack of a preamble to explain the legisla-
tive intent behind the enactment follows the lead of the Rhode Is-
land court, the legislation could be struck down as a violation of the
equal protection clause.
The most likely rationale for allowing only physician-defendants
to use evidence regarding compliance with physician practice guide-
lines is that it serves as an enticement to physicians to participate in
the Demonstration Project and in a sense affords physicians the im-
munity otherwise not attained by the legislation. If the physician is
a participant in the Demonstration Project and he or she followed
an applicable guideline, evidence of such compliance may be used to
his or her benefit. 24 Participation without compliance, according to
the legislation, could not be used to "incriminate" the physician.
Such enticement would not, and should not, be deemed by any court
to justify the disparate treatment of medical malpractice litigants
under this provision of the legislation.
2. Challenges to the Legislation on Due Process Grounds
A decision that denied a plaintiff use of evidence regarding com-
pliance with physician practice guidelines would likely face a suc-
cessful challenge on due process grounds. The Maine Constitution
provides, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.. . ."'25 and also states, "Every person,
121. Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 93 (R.I. 1983) (quoting Opinion to the
Governor, 63 A.2d 724, 729 (R.I. 1949)).
122. The preamble to the separate acts adopting the specific guidelines for the
four specialties contain cursory statements reflecting the legislative concerns. For
example, the preamble to MN. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2972 (West Supp. 1993-
1994) regarding the radiological guidelines concludes that, "[in the judgment of the
legislature, these facts create an emergency within the meaning of the Constitution
of Maine and require the following legislation as immediately necessary for the pres-
ervation of the public peace, health and safety ... ." No explanation is provided,
however, with respect to how enactment of the adoption of the particular guidelines
preserves the public peace, health, or safety.
123. L.D. 2513, Statement of Fact (114th Legislature 1990).
124. If the physician does not participate in the project, and does not comply with
a legislatively incorporated or any other written, applicable guideline, evidence of
such failure to comply would fall outside the protective shield of the statute and the
evidence would be admissible. It is also worth noting that it is only the specific
guidelines that are incorporated into the legislation that are restricted to use by de-
fendants. Any applicable guidelines, standards, or parameters otherwise relevant to
the physician-defendant's conduct that are not part of the Demonstration Project
presumably would be fair game for use by a plaintiff against the physician.
125. ME. CONsT. art. I, § 6-A.
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for an injury done him in his person, reputation, property or immu-
nities, shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice
shall be administered freely and without sale, completely and with-
out denial, promptly and without delay." 6 The Maine Constitution
and the United States Constitution are declarative of identical con-
cepts of due process. '7 The Law Court has repeatedly recognized
that due process is a flexible concept, entailing no particular form or
procedure." 8 Factors to be considered in a due process analysis in-
clude the importance of the individual's interest, the potential for
governmental error, and the magnitude of the State's interest.
1 9
Any challenge on due process grounds, however, to the constitution-
ality of the physician practice guidelines faces the presumption of
the statute's constitutionality.
130
Generally, a legislative enactment challenged on due process
grounds will be upheld if: (1) the goal of the legislation is to provide
for the benefit of the public welfare, (2) the means employed are
appropriate to the achievement of the ends sought, and (3) the man-
ner of carrying out the legislative provision is not unduly arbitrary
or capricious.131
It is well established that legislative acts adjusting economic bur-
dens and benefits carry a presumption of constitutionality and that
the party challenging an enactment on due process grounds must
establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational
manner. 32 In Houk v. Furman 1 3 the federal district court rejected
a due process challenge to Maine's prelitigation screening panel no-
tice requirements. The court found that the legislation "is rationally
related to the legitimate objective of assuring the continued availa-
bility of affordable health care in the face of increasing insurance
costs attributable, in part, to litigation costs."'" Indeed, the major-
ity of jurisdictions confronting due process challenges to medical
malpractice legislation have rejected the challenges and upheld the
enactments as constitutional.
35
126. M._ CONST. art. I, § 19.
127. Penobscot Area Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14, 24 n.9
(Me. 1981).
128. See, eg., Fichter v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 604 A.2d 433, 436-37 (Me.
1992); Giberson v. Quinn, 445 A.2d 1007, 1008 (Me. 1982).
129. Mahaney v. State, 610 A.2d 738, 742 (Me. 1992).
130. See Chestnut v. Magnusson, 942 F.2d 820, 823-24 (1st Cir. 1991).
131. See State v. Rush, 324 A.2d 748, 753 (Me. 1974).
132. See Houk v. Furman, 613 F. Supp. 1022, 1033-34 (D. Me. 1985) (quoting
Usery v. Tarner Elkhorn Mining Company, 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1034.
135. See generally Tiu, supra note 91; see also Larry S. Milner, The Constitutional-
ity of Medical Malpractice Legislative Reforn A National Survey, 18 Loy. U. Cm.
LJ. 1053 (1987).
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Other jurisdictions, however, have sustained due process chal-
lenges. For example, in Morris v. Savoy'3 6 the Ohio Supreme Court
found that a cap on the amount of damages that could be recovered
by a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case failed to pass constitu-
tional muster. The court reasoned, "It is irrational and arbitrary to
impose the cost of the intended benefit to the general public solely
upon a class consisting of those most severely injured by medical
malpractice."' 37 Similarly, in Arneson v. Olson'3 8 the North Dakota
Supreme Court found that the cumulative effect of several provi-
sions in that state's medical malpractice legislation violated the right
of medical patients to due process of law. 139 By comparison, the
Maine statute does not contain the array of suspect provisions ad-
dressed by the Arneson court, nor is it marked by the kind of bold
limitation on recovery found unconstitutional by the Ohio court in
Savoy. However, denying one party access to relevant information,
while allowing another party the use of the same information, as
does section 2975 of the Maine statute does, may trigger similar con-
stitutional concerns.
As discussed above, the inconsistencies in the legislative provi-
sions regarding the limited exculpatory use of the guidelines could
render meaningless the restriction contained in section 2975 of the
Demonstration Project legislation. This would occur if there were a
unanimous finding against a physician at the panel stage. Assuming
such a case arises, in which a court prohibits a plaintiff from present-
ing evidence to a jury of a physician's lack of compliance with physi-
cian guidelines, a reviewing court presumably would have some
difficulty in finding a rational basis to support this procedural dis-
tinction while still concluding that the plaintiff had been afforded
due process of law.
Certainly the right to a jury trial and access to the judicial process
are meaningless if the procedures afforded fail to give the litigants a
complete opportunity to have their claims tried fairly and impar-
136. 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991).
137. Id at 771 (citation omitted).
138. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
139. I& 137. In Arneson, the court was neither convinced that there was a medi-
cal insurance crisis sufficient to justify setting a cap on recoverable damages at three
hundred thousand dollars nor of the opinion that the effect of the provision was to
deny recovery to the most injured victims of medical malpractice. Id. at 136. The
court also found that a provision of the medical malpractice statute prohibiting the
joinder of medical care providers with non-medical practitioners was an unconstitu-
tional delegation of judicial authority to establish rules of procedure. Id. at 131-32.
The court also held unconstitutional a provision requiring a plaintiff to sue an insur-
ance fund, and proceed without a jury trial, if the insurer for a named defendant
paid a policy limit of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) but the plaintiff
demanded recovery beyond that amount. IL at 137. The combination of these as
well as additional suspect provisions led the court to declare the entire scheme un-
constitutional. I& at 138.
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tially. Allowing evidence to be used only by one party and not by
the other, without any sufficient articulable justification, would seem
to make the proceedings constitutionally suspect. The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that admissibility of the evidence could rea-
sonably be predicted to alter the outcome of any given case. For
these reasons, as well as for those implicating equal protection con-
cerns, the exclusive use by defendants of evidence regarding compli-
ance with practice guidelines may ultimately be held to be a
violation of the Maine and Federal Constitutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the mechanism of the affirmative defense in Maine's liabil-
ity demonstration project has not been, and may not be, tested
before the legislation expires, it is difficult to assess its practical ef-
fects. Analysis of the legislation suggests, however, at least three
conclusions which can be drawn about its implications.
First, there is a narrow window of cases within which the affirma-
tive defense of compliance with physician practice guidelines could
achieve the legislation's goal of curtailing medical malpractice
litigation.
Second, the mandatory application of the prelitigation screening
panel process significantly undermines even the potential that the
guidelines legislation will reduce the length and complexity of the
defense of medical malpractice cases. The statutory requirements of
the prelitigation screening panel process create a number of obsta-
cles. The provisions contemplate full discovery on the negligence
and causation issues which will ultimately be decided by the preliti-
gation screening panel. The panel is authorized to rule upon the
affirmative defense of "compliance," yet its findings do not resolve
the claim against the health care practitioner. Instead, if the find-
ings are unanimous, they are admissible in a jury trial. In this case
completion of the panel proceedings will not allow either party to
avoid going forward to trial. The one possibility of early termina-
tion of the suit is through a motion for summary judgment. Even if
this motion is filed during the screening panel stage, and heard by a
superior court justice, it is extremely unlikely, given the factual na-
ture of the circumstances surrounding the affirmative defense of
compliance, that the motion would be granted. Thus, assertion of
the defense will not protect physicians from having to undergo the
prelitigation screening panel process or from having to defend
claims at trial.
The third conclusion that can be drawn from the physician prac-
tice guidelines legislation is that it suffers from certain procedural
shortcomings and, more importantly, from two potential constitu-
tional infirmities. The statute does not negate the need for expert
testimony at either the panel stage or at trial. In addition, in con-
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junction with the prelitigation screening panel legislation, the statute
contains a loophole through which plaintiffs can sidestep the restric-
tion on the use of evidence regarding compliance with guidelines.
The statute contemplates that evidence regarding compliance can be
entered only by physician-defendants, not by plaintiffs. If the
screening panel unanimously finds, notwithstanding a claim of com-
pliance by a physician, that the physician breached the standard of
care, then such evidence regarding the guideline and the failure to
comply will be revealed to a jury at trial.
Absent a unanimous finding, the prohibition that prevents plain-
tiffs from using evidence regarding compliance with physician prac-
tice guidelines arguably amounts to a violation of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Maine and United States
Constitutions. Also potentially unconstitutional is that aspect of the
legislation which bestows upon the prelitigation screening panel the
authority to resolve the issue of the affirmative defense of compli-
ance. If this provision is construed to deprive plaintiffs of either a
summary judgment hearing on the affirmative defense or a jury trial
in superior court, the statute should be deemed to violate the pro-
tections afforded under the Maine Constitution regarding a litigant's
right to a full and fair trial before a jury.
The Maine legislature should amend the Demonstration Project
and related statutory provisions. There are two effective ways to
resolve the practical obstacles to meeting the goals of this enact-
ment. One way would be to repeal the screening panel legislation,
the other to create an exception to its application. Presumably the
former is not feasible. 140 The latter would entail revising provisions
such as section 2855 of the prelitigation screening panel legislation.
For example, the provision could carve out an exception, triggered
by a physician-defendant who is a participant in the Demonstration
Project asserting compliance with guidelines as a defense in a medi-
cal malpractice case. Instead of a panel deciding, after a hearing,
whether a defendant complied with a particular guideline, the mat-
ter would be removed from the panel process entirely to superior
court for resolution either by summary judgment or trial. The par-
ties could stipulate, or the court would have to find as a matter of
law, that the physician-defendant was a participant in the Demon-
stration Project and that the statutorily adopted guidelines were ap-
plicable in the particular case.
In order to avoid the most critical constitutional infirmity in the
Demonstration Project, section 2975(2) should be amended to allow
both plaintiffs and defendants equal access to, and use of, evidence
140. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address whether the prelitigation
screening panel legislation, aside from undermining the goals of the physician prac-
tice guidelines project, is an effective means of curtailing medical malpractice
litigation.
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regarding compliance with practice guidelines. Such an amendment
would likely diminish the popularity of the legislation among the
medical community. It should be recognized, however, that plain-
tiffs have access to guidelines other than those incorporated in the
statute and could use them to measure a physician's adherence to an
applicable standard of care. The statute does not protect physicians
from the use of such other relevant evidence. Thus, treating physi-
cian-defendants equally with other litigants does not alter the play-
ing field of medical malpractice litigation significantly.
If the Demonstration Project retains the one-sided use of physi-
cian practice guidelines and flaunts its potential constitutional flaw
by allowing only physician-defendants to introduce evidence of
compliance, then the prelitigation screening panel statute must be
amended. As written, if there is a unanimous panel decision in a
plaintiff's favor, notwithstanding a physician's claim of compliance
with physician practice guidelines, the prelitigation screening panel
statute requires jurors to be informed of the panel's unanimous re-
suilts. Thus, plaintiffs ultimately are able to use the otherwise "for-
bidden" evidence. To protect the intent of the Demonstration
Project, an exception to this provision is necessary. While such an
amendment would resolve the inconsistency in the two legislative
enactments, it also would exacerbate the constitutional problems
which accompany the skewed use of evidence regarding physician
practice guidelines. In the end, equal access to evidence by plaintiffs
and defendants alike should be permitted.

